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SUMMARY 
Objective: To analyse and synthesize available international experiences and information on the motivation for, and 
effects of using capitation as provider payment method in country health systems and lessons and implications for 
low/middle-income countries.   
Methods: We did narrative review and synthesis of the literature on the effects of capitation payment on primary 
care.  
Results: Eleven articles were reviewed. Capitation payment encourages efficiency: drives down cost, serves as criti-
cal source of income for providers, promotes adherence to guidelines and policies, encourages providers to work 
better and give health education to patients. It, however, induces reduction in the quantity and quality of care pro-
vided and encourages skimming on inputs, underserving of patients in bad state of health, “dumping” of high risk 
patients and negatively affect patient-provider relationship.    
Conclusion: The illustrative evidence adduced from the review demonstrates that capitation payment in primary 
care can create positive incentives but could also elicit un-intended effects. However, due to differences in country 
context, policy makers in Ghana and other low/middle-income countries may only be guided by the illustrative evi-
dence in their design of a context-specific capitation payment for primary care.  
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INTRODUCTION 
There is growing demand for more health care within 
budgetary constraints, making it imperative for govern-
ments to implement cost-containment measures to en-
sure uninterrupted provisioning of health care services 
for their populations without compromising quality.1, 2 
Such cost-containment measures may be embedded in 
health sector reforms that apply various strategies such 
as making hospitals autonomous, implementing provid-
er-purchaser split 3, 4 and reforming the provider pay-
ment system. 2, 5 The literature provides many forms of 
payment methods, including salary, budgetary transfers, 
fee-for-service, case-based/diagnosis-related-group 
(DRG), capitation payment, pay-for-performance and 
mixed methods. 1, 6, 7 It must be acknowledged that each 
payment method elicits specific response from providers 
and, therefore, countries contemplating the adoption of 
any payment method may have to study the implemen-
tation experience of pioneering countries to understand 
the issues that these payment methods raise in order to 
inform their country-specific design. In Canada policy 
makers sought guidance from the literature in their 
choice of payment method. 8 The National Health Insur-
ance Authority (NHIA) in Ghana, as part of its provider 
payment reforms, is exploring capitation payment for 
primary care and this study seeks to scan available liter-
ature and synthesize illustrative evidence on effects of 
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capitation payment for primary care in order to contrib-
ute to on-going discussion of the payment reforms in 
Ghana. Findings will also provide useful lessons for 
other health insurance agencies in low/middle-income 
countries.  We seek to addresses three specific study 
questions: (i) what has been the motivation for imple-
menting capitation payment in countries’ health care 
systems? (ii) What effects has capitation payment had 
on primary care provision? (iii) What lessons can Ghana 
and other low/middle income countries learn from these 
international experiences? We begin by reflecting on the 
considerations underlying provider payment methods in 
an attempt to address study question one; and then nar-
row the focus on effects of capitation payment to ad-
duce illustrative evidence to address study question two. 
Study question three will be addressed in the concluding 
part of the discussion where recommendations would be 
offered the NHIA and other health insurance agencies in 
low/middle-income countries that may be considering 
capitation payment for primary care. 
 
Considerations underlying provider payment  
The rationale for reforming provider payment systems 
has been the need for countries to contain the increasing 
cost of health care services without compromising 
quality. 9, 10, 11 However, economic theory maintains that 
changes in provider payment systems attract responses 
from providers 12 which could affect the quality and 
quantity of service provided. 13 In the following para-
graphs, we discuss key payment methods and the incen-
tives they create in care delivery. 
 
Fee-for-service payment is used to reimburse health 
care providers on “per item of service provided” basis 
and aligns provider income to quantity of service pro-
vided. 7 While it helps to generate valuable health in-
formation to guide clinical decisions and draws provid-
ers’ attention to patient satisfaction in order to retain 
them on their list, it may create incentives to increase 
service provision because the financial risk rests with 
the payer. 14 It is described as reward for “volume and 
intensity rather than value”; and “inflationary and inef-
fective in containing cost”. 15 Barnum et al 6 associate 
supplier-induced demand with fee-for-service but 
Rosen 14 argues that when providers advise patients in 
their capacity as agents in care delivery, their influence 
on patients’ actions may only be described as “physi-
cian-initiated” demand. Fee-for-service is widely used 
in countries such as Belgium, Germany and Japan. 1 In 
many low/middle-income countries fee-for-service may 
be the dominant payment method for reimbursing pro-
vider but there are moves to adopt diagnosis-related-
grouping (DRG) payment as part of measures to address 
the negative incentives of fee-for-service payment.16  
In Ghana, the NHIA initially adopted fee-for-service 
payment but switched to DRG payment following the 
observed negative incentives that the fee-for-service 
created in the system. 
 
DRG provides means for relating diagnosis and treat-
ment to cost. Under DRG, providers are paid a pre-
determined amount for services rendered based on epi-
sode of illness with the initial motivation to provide 
framework for monitoring quality of care and utiliza-
tion.17 It is deemed to have strong incentive to induce 
efficiency and cost-containment but requires quality 
control and monitoring systems to forestall possible 
perverse incentives. 1 DRG was introduced by the Unit-
ed States Medicare programme to contain an observed 
increasing health care expenditure 18 and a number of 
low/middle-income countries including Ghana are using 
various forms of DRG methods to reimburse their health 
care providers. 16 In Ghana DRG rates are fixed in ad-
vance for a given diagnosis or diagnosis cluster but the 
reimbursement is made after the services have been ren-
dered. Upon realization that the DRG creates incentives 
for providers to “game” the National Health Insurance 
Scheme (NHIS) the NHIA in Ghana is exploring capita-
tion payment for primary care.  
 
Under capitation payment, providers are paid agreed 
sum of money per insured member for a period of time 
to provide pre-determined services for enrolees. Two 
types of capitation systems may be identified: list capi-
tation and geographic capitation.2 ,19 The list capitation 
payment ties the aggregate income of the provider to the 
number of patients enrolled to him/her while geographic 
capitation payment ties reimbursement to the population 
living within a particular geographical area. Capitation 
payment is expected to promote efficient use of re-
sources by controlling prices and volumes of services 
provided. Payers of health care services have the benefit 
of knowing their budgets in advance under capitation 
payment; while providers pay attention to health literacy 
to keep their enrolees healthy in order to save cost.2 It is 
noted to  eliminate supplier-induced demand associated 
with fee-for-service payment7, 14 but, unless the capitat-
ed rate is risk-adjusted, at least by age and sex, provid-
ers may provide less care for perceived risk groups on 
their list.1,20 Many countries in the world, including the 
Scandinavian countries, United Kingdom (UK) and 
Thailand apply capitation payment but with varia-
tions.21,22 The UK applies full risk-adjustment formula 
for calculating the capitated rate, Denmark adjust its 
capitated rate by age and sex while capitation rate in 
Thailand is determined by government and has no risk-
adjustment formula.21 Many countries in Central Europe 
and the Baltic states use capitation adjusted for age and 
sex to pay for primary care.23 Ghana introduced capita-
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tion payment for primary care service under its national 
health insurance scheme as a pilot project in 2012 and 
plans to scale it up across the country. Unlike many 
other countries, the capitated rate in Ghana is not risk-
adjusted. Besides, it is organised around institutional 
providers, be they public or private, who serve as the 
contracting unit of primary care whereas in many high-
income countries, capitation is organized around Gen-
eral Practitioners (GPs). 
 
METHODS 
 
Figure 1 Literature selection strategy 
We did a narrative review of the literature to present a 
synthesis of knowledge from published complementary 
studies on the effects of capitation payment. Narrative 
reviews are useful educational materials for faculties 
and for updating practitioners on clinical protocols and 
by discussing recent and best knowledge on a specific 
intervention from complementary (but not necessarily 
similar) studies.24,25   
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from www.prisma-statement.org (2009) 
 
We searched for articles in PubMed, Science Direct, 
Web of Science and Google Scholar. We initially lim-
ited the scope to low/middle-income countries (LMICs) 
but given the few articles found addressing the issues of 
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interest, we expanded the scope beyond LMICs. Publi-
cations that addressed capitation-specific effects on 
primary care were considered for the final analysis (Ta-
ble 1). Others that compared capitation with other pay-
ment methods, book chapters and technical working 
papers that analysed the motivation for, and effects of 
provider payment methods were considered for initial 
review to enrich the background discussion. Articles 
that did not address capitation-specific effects and those 
which study design and setting were not clearly stated 
were excluded. Figure 1 depicts the literature selection 
strategy.  
 
Ethical approval for the study (certified protocol num-
ber: UG-ECH 057/13-14) was obtained from the Uni-
versity of Ghana Institute of Statistical, Social and Eco-
nomic Research (ISSER) Ethics Committee for Hu-
mans. 
 
RESULTS 
We present the results in two sections: description of the 
search results and findings on effects of capitation on 
primary care.   
 
Description of search results 
We retrieved 1,802 articles during our initial search. 
Removal of duplicates reduced them to 1,225. We ex-
cluded 1,159 articles which did not meet the selection 
criteria during screening of titles and abstracts. Upon 
screening of the remaining 66 full text articles, we set-
tled on 11 for final review and reporting: two from Asia, 
three from Europe and six from the Americas. Study 
design and methods for the studies that were used in the 
analysis included: cross-sectional survey, retrospective 
(study) analysis, controlled experimental investigation, 
longitudinal study and pre-post design with control 
group.  
 
Effects of capitation payment method  
In this section, we present the positive and negative 
incentives that capitation creates in primary care deliv-
ery.  
 
Positive effects 
The key motivation for implementing capitation pay-
ment in country health systems has been the desire to 
contain cost of care provision. Consistent with this mo-
tivation, we found in our review that capitation payment 
could help contain cost 27 and serve as critical source of 
income for providers. 26 It is associated with slower 
growth of health care expenditures on services that were 
found to be profitable under fee-for-service. 27 Ponce et 
al 28 report of cost saving of 29% and 21% on pharma-
ceutical and laboratory services respectively, under cap-
itation payment. With regard to quality of care, capita-
tion payment was found to encourage better standardi-
zation of care and improvement in clinical outcomes 
alongside cost reduction. 28 Findings from studies in the 
Netherlands 29 and Portugal 28 also suggest that there 
could be no decrease in the quality of care provided 
under capitation payment. Glazier et al 30 on their part 
did not find any significant difference in the compre-
hensiveness and continuity of care between capitated 
and fee-for-service patients. Regarding provider attitude 
towards work, we found that Primary Care Physicians 
(PCPs) worked better within capitation payment regime 
and felt that their patients had reasonable access to ap-
propriate care. 31 Capitation was found to be associated 
with increased adherence to policies and general guide-
lines  on the part of providers 29 and incentivized them 
to give health education to their patients 32 with the view 
to keeping their clients healthy thereby reducing cost of 
providing curative health care services. 
 
Negative effects 
The negative effects of capitation were mostly noted in 
the areas of quantity and quality of care as well as pa-
tient-provider relationship. With regard to quantity of 
care, a study found that PCPs provide services lower 
than optimal for capitated patients and underserve pa-
tients in bad and intermediate state of health while simi-
lar patients with fee-for-service providers receive ser-
vices higher than optimal with those in good and inter-
mediate state of health being over served.33 It was noted 
that physicians on capitation payment administered 
fewer medication to chronic patients under capitation 
and used less expensive health personnel such as gener-
alists to manage specialist conditions; and nurse-aides 
rather than nurses to provide care for capitated insured 
clients.26 Capitation was found to be associated with the 
shifting of potentially primary care services to other 
areas of care and as Glazier et al30 reported,  providers 
under capitation payment experienced more visits to 
emergency department with higher proportion being 
semi-urgent and non-urgent. They had relatively higher 
number of in-patients visits than those in enhanced fee-
for-service practice and enrolled fewer new patients. In 
terms of quality care, private hospitals were found to 
use less expensive inputs to provide care for insured 
patients, provided fewer medicines to chronic patients 
and discriminating against higher cost insured clients by 
developing strategies to “dump” them.26 With regard to 
provider attitude, we noted that primary care physicians 
had a negative perception about the capitation payment 
with concerns over provider income and strained rela-
tionship with patients.31 Studies that reported on patient-
provider relationship indicated that patients accessing 
healthcare from capitated physicians showed lower level 
of trust in their physicians34 and that were 36% more 
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likely to switch their primary care providers than those 
with fee-for-service-paid providers.35 This finding was, 
however, contradicted in another study36 that did not 
establish any negative effect of capitation payment on 
patients’ trust for primary care providers that were paid 
by capitation method.  
 
DISCUSSION 
In this section, we discuss findings/results of the review 
beginning with the motivation for implementing provid-
er payment reforms in country health systems. We then 
focus the second part of the discussion on the effects of 
capitation on primary care delivery and conclude with 
some recommendations for consideration by Ghana and 
other low/middle-income countries. 
 
Motivation for introducing payment reforms in 
country health systems:  
We noted from the background studies that reforms in 
health system financing, including provider payment 
reforms, in both high and low/middle-income countries 
are driven by the need to improve efficiency in the pro-
vision and use of health care services with the view to 
containing cost of health care services. 37, 9, 11, 38, 39, 20  A 
major area of focus in the provider payment reform is 
geared towards the application of capitation payment. 
Medicare in the United States of America (USA) intro-
duced payment reforms as a result of increasing ex-
penditure it was experiencing. Hungary introduced capi-
tation payment in 2008 to improve efficiency in the al-
location of health care resources. 40 In the Swedish 
healthcare system, characterized by provider-purchaser 
split and devolvement of financial responsibility to the 
county level, provider payment at primary care level 
follows patient’s choice of provider and a system of 
fixed payment for registered patients is implement-
ed. 41 Consistent with these and other countries, the 
main objective for introducing capitation payment in 
Ghana is to contain cost while ensuring quality of care. 
It must, however, be noted that country specific context 
such as the gross national income per capita, the health 
expenditure per capita and the proportion of the gross 
domestic product devoted to health care influence the 
incentives that payment method creates. Ghana being a 
lower-middle-income country has relatively low income 
per capita (PPP Intl. $3) compared to Thailand in Asia 
(PPP Intl. $13), the Netherlands in Europe (PPP Intl. $ 
43) and the United States in the Americas (PPP intl. $ 
53). Ghana’s total expenditure on health per capita ex-
pressed in international dollars as of 2013 was $214 
compared with Thailand ($658), the Netherlands (5, 
601) and the United States ($9, 146). The proportion of 
GDP devoted to health in Ghana was 5.4% in 2013 
whereas the Netherlands and the United States devoted 
12.9% and 17.1%, respectively to their health sectors. 
(Ref: http://www.who.int/countries. Accessed on 
11/05/2016). Besides, many countries apply payment 
methods differently as may be observed in the Nether-
lands where general practitioners are paid through a mix 
of capitation (Euro 52 per patient) and fee-for-service 
for each additional contact (Euro 9 for consultation). 42 
These and other contextual differences do not provide 
same conditions and motivation for the adoption of a 
particular payment method and the incentives created 
across countries. In the case of Ghana, therefore, re-
search is needed to ascertain whether capitation pay-
ment would achieve the cost-containment objective for 
which it was introduced. 
 
Effects of capitation payment on primary care  
One of the expected positive effects of capitation im-
plementation in Ghana was slow growth in cost of 
health care services. Consistent with this expectation, 
evidence on cost of health care services under capitation 
payment shows some cost reduction in care delivery, 
especially in the area of pharmaceutical products and 
use of diagnostic equipment. 27, 28 However, NHIA pays 
for drugs on fee-for-service basis and therefore cannot 
benefit from the cost reduction experienced in countries 
that include drugs in the capitated basket of services. 
The issue of whether or not to include medicines in the 
basket of capitated services in Ghana was hotly debated 
among key stakeholders. Whereas the NHIA had plans 
to include medicines in the capitated package of ser-
vices, health care providers were not in favour of it, a 
stance that some analysts may construe as “defence 
mechanism” on the part of the (Community) Pharmacist 
to protect their business considering that many health 
facilities, especially the public and mission facilities, 
have pharmacies or dispensaries attached to them and 
may not refer patients to them to fill their prescription. 
On the part of managers of health facilities with dispen-
saries it may also be seen as a strategy to reject the per-
ceived financial risk that may be associated with medi-
cines being part of the capitated package of services.  
 
With regard to quality of care, since evidence has shown 
that capitation payment encourages better standardiza-
tion of care, improvement in clinical outcomes along-
side cost reduction 28 and is  associated with increased 
adherence to policies and general guidelines 29 the Min-
istry of Health would have to invest time and efforts in 
the capitation implementation process to secure its ut-
most benefit for the population. The finding that capita-
tion payment incentivized providers to give health edu-
cation to their patients32 and that there could be no de-
crease in the quality of care provided under capitation 
payment29,28  and the fact that providers worked better 
under capitation payment regime31 brings hope for Gha-
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na, if the capitation payment policy is well implement-
ed. This brings into focus the issue of managed competi-
tion that the Thai capitation payment introduced among 
public and private providers26 and which incentivised 
the public providers to work better in order to maximize 
their income and to survive that “healthy” competition. 
In the same way, under capitation payment regime, pro-
viders in Ghana have to compete among themselves to 
catch the attention and win the trust of insured-patients 
in order to enlist and retain them in their service to max-
imize their income. The NHIA envisaged that capitation 
payment would help its credentialed providers with their 
financial planning and improve their income. Consistent 
with this expectation, evidence from the review shows 
that capitation payment serves as critical source of in-
come to providers and had the ability to provide be-
tween 20% and 30% profit margin for private hospitals 
in Thailand.26 However, the evidence further indicates 
that Thai private providers had initially responded nega-
tively to the introduction of capitation on the basis of 
perceived low rate of the capitated amount. In some 
cases, the perceived extra cost is shifted to the consumer 
through un-authorized co-payment. This has implication 
for Ghana. Many of NHIA’s credentialed providers are 
private providers who earn their income from services 
provided to (insured) clients. There are also the mission 
health care providers whose salaries of their profession-
al staff are paid from government budget but bear their 
capital, service and administrative expenditures on their 
own. These expenditures are paid from the income they 
generate from the services they provide to (insured) 
clients. With respect to government operated health 
facilities, although their salaries and capital expendi-
tures are borne by government, they are required to gen-
erate adequate income from the services they provide to 
(insured) clients either through direct out-of-pocket 
payment or insurance to pay for their recurrent expendi-
tures. A switch from fee-for-service and DRG to capita-
tion payment without the capitated rate being accepted 
to be realistic by payers and providers may be viewed 
by the providers as negatively affecting their income 
flow, a situation which could incentivize them to 
“game” the system to make up for perceived income 
loss. Providers in Ghana complain about low rate of the 
capitated amount although this concern is not supported 
by evidence since neither the NHIA nor the provider 
group has done actual costing of services to determine 
the adequacy or otherwise of the capitated rate. It 
would, therefore, be in the interest of Ghana for both the 
NHIA and provider groups to support the Ministry of 
Health to undertake costing studies in order to deter-
mine the real cost of service provision to inform the 
calculation of the capitated rate. 
Notwithstanding the positive effects of capitation, our 
review identified some negative effects in relation to 
quantity and quality of care as well as patients-provider 
relationship. A study of effects of compensation meth-
ods on physicians perceived incentives to alter services 
to patients concluded that “the way physicians are com-
pensated affect their incentives to increase or decrease 
services to patients”, with capitation being associated 
with incentive to reduce the quantity of service to pa-
tients. 43 This is corroborated by evidence from our re-
view which points to a decline in quantity of service 
provided. 26, 30, 33 Countries have tried to address the 
tendency of care providers shifting potentially primary 
care cases to other levels of care by  providing addition-
al incentives to encourage low utilization at the second-
ary level, but evidence shows that such interventions 
fail to achieve the desired effect.44  
 
On quality of care evidence shows that capitation pro-
vides incentive for care providers to skim on inputs by 
using less expensive health personnel to provide care 
beyond their competence in order to maximize their 
income to compensate for perceived income loss26 and  
referring potentially primary care cases to higher lev-
els.45,46,47 This behaviour undermines the cost-
containment objective of capitation because potential 
low cost that would have been borne at the primary care 
level is pushed to higher levels to attract higher cost 
thereby increasing the overall cost burden on the entire 
health system.  It could also provide basis for stakehold-
ers who are opposed to capitation payment in Ghana for 
its perceived negative effects on care delivery to contin-
ue their objection to the policy. It may, however, be 
argued that resorting to the use of less expensive health 
personnel without any discriminatory intent could be 
understood as task-shifting which is acknowledged to be 
“the vanguard for the renaissance of primary health 
care”.48 Studies on task shifting49,50 report its usefulness 
in addressing human resource shortages in resource-
constrained economies, of which Ghana is not an excep-
tion. In China, one way of preventing providers from 
engaging in excessive cost reduction in response to 
payment reform and to assure quality of service was for 
the Social Insurance Bureau (the NHIA in the case of 
Ghana) to require that the number of patients treated by 
providers be at least 90% of the previous year’s while 
their total spending should not be below 90% of budg-
et. 27 Such an intervention in Ghana will, however, re-
quire a robust monitoring and evaluation system to track 
performance in order not to create incentives for provid-
ers to duplicate utilization to benefit from un-earned 
claims. At the onset of capitation implementation in 
Ghana, the NHIA had to accept providers demand to 
take off maternal care services from the capitated basket 
of service since capitation was perceived to have poten-
tial to compromise the quality of maternal care. Contra-
ry to this opinion however, evidence from Portugal 
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showed that there was no decrease in the quality of care 
provided after capitation payment was introduced.28 
Besides, patients accessing services from capitated pri-
mary care providers were found to be more likely to 
receive health education if their primary care providers 
were paid primarily by capitation method.32 These find-
ings provide inspiration for Ghana to re-consider includ-
ing maternal health care package in the capitated basket 
of services in the future.  
 
On patient-provider relationship, though some evidence 
showed that patients were not comfortable with their 
physicians being reimbursed on capitation basis and 
expressed lower level of trust in their physicians34,  a 
situation that systematically affected the doctor-patient 
relationship and patients who were expected to be loyal 
to their PCPs were found to be more likely to switch 
their PCPs if the latter was paid by capitation35 although 
some other evidence contradicted it.36 Besides, it must 
be noted that although  patients’ satisfaction surveys are 
acceptable mechanism for measuring quality from pa-
tients’ perspectives and are good to explore views of 
patients on care they receive; and help providers to re-
flect on their services and adjust to meet clients’ needs 
and expectations, patients’ perception of quality may 
not necessarily reflect clinical quality. Some of the neg-
ative perception about the perceived quality of care re-
ceived from providers may be caused by the asymmetry 
of knowledge between care providers and their clients. 
In the case of China, the negative perception expressed 
by respondents in the studies reviewed may have been 
influenced by the negative media reportage on the pro-
vider payment reform.51 In LMICs like Ghana where 
demand for providers is higher than supply, it could be 
difficult for patients to switch providers in protest 
against perceived poor quality of care received. It 
would, therefore, be commendable for policy makers 
and health insurance agencies in low and middle-
income countries to collaborate with the media to pro-
mote such reforms while encouraging them to expose 
negative practices that could derail the reform agenda. 
The media should, however, not be a substitute for mon-
itoring and evaluation, which is required to track per-
formance and identify un-intended consequences for 
early redress.  
 
Lessons learned 
Apart from the evidence alluded to above, the review 
has brought to the fore issues that Ghana and other low 
and middle-income countries may consider as part of 
the adaptable lessons from pioneering countries imple-
menting capitation payment system. 
 
Firstly, it must be acknowledged that there are lots of 
constraints when it comes to the development of an effi-
cient and effective provider payment mechanism, the 
most important constraint being availability of data on 
actual cost of services provided, volume of services 
produced and characteristics of the consumers of ser-
vices. This is extremely so in low and middle-income 
countries, including Ghana where costing of health care 
services has been constrained by lack of credible data 
for better analysis. This calls for commitment and sup-
port of the Ministries of Health towards targeted studies 
on costing of health care services in order to provide 
realistic and evidence-based information for the devel-
opment of system-wide provider payment systems. Such 
an intervention could help address the issue of whether 
or not the capitated rate is adequate. 
 
Secondly, evidence from the study of patients’ attitude 
towards their physicians financial incentives34 shows 
that more respondents with higher level of income and 
exposure to higher education expressed higher discom-
fort with their providers being paid by capitation and 
that their discomfort may have been influenced by their 
exposure to negative media reportage  on reimburse-
ment system for providers and the effect that such sys-
tem has on their service provision. In Thailand, evi-
dence shows that the media drew policy makers and the 
general public’s attention to the negative practices that 
hospitals used to maximize their income from the capi-
tated amount on the social security workers.26 The vi-
brant media landscape in Ghana provides opportunity 
for the NHIA to collaborate with the media to promote 
the positive attributes of capitation payment while at the 
same time encouraging the media to expose negative 
practices that may have the potential to derail the im-
plementation process.  
 
Thirdly, the NHIA may learn from the managed compe-
tition that came along with the introduction of capitation 
in Thailand. Evidence shows that the Social Security 
Scheme’s capitation payment system introduced in 
Thailand brought awareness to the public hospitals that 
they were in competition with the private sector and this 
encouraged them to improve the quality of service they 
provided to keep them in the competition.26 They were 
incentivized to attract more clients to maximize their 
income since the quantum of their income did not de-
pend any longer on the volume of services provided but 
rather the number of enrolees that stayed on their list. 
Such a healthy competition is needed in Ghana to en-
hance quality of service especially in the public sector 
and capitation offers an opportunity in that direction. 
 
Fourthly, apart from the cost-containment and quality of 
care issues, capitation payment has the potential to in-
centivise managers of health facilities to keep to the 
optimal staffing levels in order to save cost and thereby 
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help address the equity issues in the distribution of hu-
man resource for health52 by re-distributing “excess” 
staff to underserved areas.  
 
Finally, the NHIA may want to note that a switch to 
capitation payment requires intense involvement of all 
stakeholders, both in the preparation of the capitation 
package and in the organization and implementation of 
the reform. Besides, the NHIA would have to come to 
terms with the persistent tension that is expected be-
tween the technical accuracy of the formulae for calcu-
lating capitated rates and the desire for simplicity. 
While the former promotes efficiency and equity the 
latter promotes political accountability. Evidence from 
Hungary 40 shows that such tension slowed down the 
formula development process and therefore the NHIA 
should not expect results from the policy reforms over-
night but rather look up to a medium to long term period 
of 5 to 10 years for a successful completion of the pro-
cess of defining a funding formula that meets the de-
sired resource allocation goals and which successfully 
comprises risk adjustment, risk sharing and other com-
plementary policies.  
 
CONCLUSION 
From the preceding discussion, one cannot but agree 
with Rosen that there is no perfect payment method in 
health care delivery. Each payment method has its 
strengths and weaknesses and different payment meth-
ods and incentives produce different effects in different 
contexts. Policy makers in Ghana and other low/middle-
income countries would have to consider adapting the 
positive experiences to their country specific context 
while being cautioned by the negative effects and covet-
ing them into opportunities for improvement. They may 
also want to appreciate the need for a mix of payment 
methods to leverage the positive incentives of each of 
them and mitigate their negative effects since there is no 
provider payment method that is a panacea to the rising 
health care cost.  
 
Limitations:  
The review was limited to publications in English. The 
number of articles included in the final analysis is lim-
ited to eleven articles out of which nine are set in high 
income countries with different health system and con-
text from those of LMICs. Besides, the context in Gha-
na and other LMICs is not favorably comparable to that 
of the countries from which the articles were retrieved 
for the study. However, since the aim was to look for 
illustrative evidence for adaption to country specific 
situation, insights from the review bring relevant lessons 
to Ghana’s NHIA and health insurance agencies in other 
low and middle-income countries that are considering 
capitation as payment method for primary out-patient 
care.  
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Table 1 Description of studies included in the final analysis, showing major findings/conclusions and effects of capitation payment  
 
No. 
Study refer-
ence 
Country & 
characteristics 
Study objective Study design/method Sample size Major findings/conclusions Effect Positive (+) Nega-
tive(-) 
1. Mills, A et 
al, 2000 
Thailand To understand the internal 
responses of providers to 
the incentives inherent in 
the capitation payment 
mechanism. 
Cross sectional survey 
using extensive semi-
structured interviews 
with managers and staff 
of the study hospitals. 
2 main provider net-
works and 9 hospitals 
in Bangkok 
Private hospitals use less expensive 
inputs to provide care for insured cli-
ents under capitation payment.   
Quality of care (-)  
Private hospitals provide fewer medi-
cines to chronic patients as a cost-
containment measure. 
Quality/quantity of care 
provided (-)  
Some private hospitals developed strat-
egies to “dump” higher cost insured 
clients and deter them from re-
registering with them. 
Quality of 
care/discrimination (-)  
Capitation provides strong incentives 
for contracting between different pro-
viders  
Provider attitude (+)  
Capitation encouraged the development 
of provider networks due to accessibil-
ity concerns and relative over-capacity 
among private hospitals in Bangkok 
city. 
Provider attitude (+) 
Capitation served as critical source of 
income to providers and could generate 
between 20% to 30% profit margins for 
private hospitals in Thailand. 
Provider income (+) 
2. Yip et al, 
2004 
China To identify effects of sup-
ply-side payment reform 
on different categories of 
expenditures 
Pre-post study designs 
with control group- a 
natural experiment. 
6 hospitals that are 
cost drivers in Hainan-
China. 
Capitation payment is associated with a 
slower rate of growth of expenditure on 
services that are profitable under fee-
for-service. 
Cost-containment (+)  
3. Ponce P et 
al, 2013 
Portugal To review the components 
of the Portuguese Capita-
tion package, including 
efficiency changes after the 
introduction of capitation. 
Retrospective (trend) 
analyses of Portuguese 
Nephro Care clinics 
(from January 2008 to 
December 2010) 
34 Portuguese Nephro 
care Clinics with 4,200 
patients 
There was a clear improvement in 
clinical outcome alongside cost reduc-
tion.  
 
Cost-containment/quality 
of care (+)  
There was 29% and 21% cost savings 
on pharmaceutical and laboratory ser-
vices, respectively.  
Cost-containment (+)  
There was better standardization of care 
under capitation payment. 
Quality of care (+)  
4. Van Dijk C. 
et al, 2013 
The Nether-
lands 
To investigate whether 
changes in GP remunera-
tion system through differ-
ent financial incentives 
affected quality of care in 
terms of guidelines adher-
ence 
Longitudinal study 
analysing differences in 
trends for guidelines 
adherence from 2002 to 
2009 between publicly 
and privately insured 
patients. 
21, 421 to 39, 828 
patients record from 
32 to 52 general prac-
tices. 
General guidelines adherence increased 
by 7% for publicly insured patients and 
10% for privately insured patients. 
Provider attitude (+)  
Changes in provider payment did not 
have significant effect on guidelines 
adherence between publicly insured and 
privately insured patients. 
Provider attitude (+)  
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5. Pearson et al. 
(2013) 
USA To determine whether 
capitation payment to 
primary care providers is 
associated with patient 
education being included 
more frequently during 
office visits compared with 
other payments. 
Cross-sectional analysis 
of patients’ visit to 
primary care providers 
using the 2009 National 
Ambulatory Care Sur-
vey data. 
9,863 patient visits in 
which capitation status 
was available and 
provider was the pa-
tients’ primary care 
provider. 
 Patients were more likely to receive 
health education from providers paid 
primarily by capitation method. 
 
Provider attitude (+)  
6. Glazier R. H 
et al, 2009 
Canada To evaluate practice char-
acteristics and patterns 
under capitation and en-
hanced fee-for-service. 
Retrospective cohort 
study using administra-
tive data 
n/a Patients in capitated practice had less 
after work hours of care and more visits 
to emergency department. 
Quality/quantity of care 
provided (-)  
Physicians paid by capitation method 
enrolled fewer new patients than those 
paid by fee-for-service. 
Provider attitude (-) 
There was no difference in the compre-
hensiveness and continuity of care 
between capitated and fee-for-service 
patients. 
Quality of care (+) 
7. Cykert et al. 
(1997) 
USA To assess physicians’ 
attitude towards HMOs 
that utilize capitation pay-
ment for reimbursement of 
services. 
Electronic-based na-
tional survey using self-
administered question-
naires 
482 out of 899 eligible 
primary care physi-
cians responded. 
Primary care physicians had negative 
perception about the capitation payment 
method. 
Provider attitude (-)  
Primary care physicians worked better 
within capitated payment regime. 
Provider attitude (+)  
8. Hennig-
Schmidt et 
al, 2011 
Germany To improve understanding 
on how incentives from the 
payment systems FFS and 
CAP influence Physicians 
behaviour 
Experimental investiga-
tion (controlled labora-
tory experiment) 
42 medical students Physicians provide medical services 
significantly lower than optimal for 
patients in capitation payment regime 
but provide services significantly high-
er than optimal for patients in fee-for-
service practice. 
Provider atti-
tude/quality/quantity of 
care provided (-)  
      Physicians paid by capitation method 
underserve patients in bad and interme-
diate state of health while patients in 
good and intermediate state of health 
are over served by those  paid by fee-
for-service method 
Provider atti-
tude/quality/quantity of 
care provided (-)  
9. Sorbero E.S 
et al, 2003 
USA To  examine the relation-
ship between patient case 
mix, utilization, primary 
care physician (PCP) pay-
ment method and the prob-
ability that patients will 
switch their PCP 
Conceptual model Ret-
rospective administra-
tive data, (multivariate 
analysis) 
67, 131 patients and 
682 PCPs. 
Patients whose primary care providers 
were paid by capitation method were 
36% more likely to switch their provid-
er than those with fee-for-service-paid 
provider. 
Patient-provider relation-
ship / patients (-)  
Patients with high utilization behaviour 
were significantly more likely to switch 
capitated provider than were similar 
patients of FFS-paid provider. 
Patient-provider relation-
ship / patients (-) 
10. Pereira G. 
Ann et al, 
2001 
USA To assess patient attitude 
towards physician com-
pensation model and to 
explore patients’ character-
Cross-sectional (elec-
tronic) survey 
2,000 adult patients in 
New England HMO 
Patients who knew their primary care 
physician was paid through capitation 
frequently expressed discomfort with 
capitation payment. 
Patient-provider relation-
ship / patients (-)  
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istics associated with these 
attitudes. 
Wealthier and more educated patients 
were more likely to express their dis-
comfort with capitation payment. 
Patient-provider relation-
ship / patients (-)  
11. Hall et al. 
(2002) 
USA To assess the impact on 
trust of disclosing HMOs’ 
primary care physicians’ 
payment methods to their 
enrolees. 
Hall et al. (2002) USA Disclosing the positive and negative 
features of incentives and increasing 
knowledge of them does not reduce 
trust in physicians or insurers and may 
have mild positive impact on physician 
trust. 
Patient-provider relation-
ship / patients (+)   
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